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An object with a unique three-dimensional (3D) optical phase mask attached is analyzed for security and 
authentication. These 3D optical phase masks are more difficult to duplicate or to have a mathematical formulation 
compared with 2D masks, and thus have improved security capabilities. A quick response code was modulated 
using a random 3D optical phase mask generating a 3D optical phase code (OPC). Due to the scattering of light 
through the 3D OPC, a unique speckle pattern based on the materials and structure in the 3D optical phase mask is 
generated and recorded on a CCD device. Feature extraction is performed by calculating the mean, variance, 
skewness, kurtosis, and entropy for each recorded speckle pattern. The random forest classifier is used for 
authentication. Optical experiments demonstrate the feasibility of the authentication scheme.   
OCIS codes: (100.4993) Pattern recognition, optical security and encryption,  (030.6140) Speckle; (110.0110) Imaging systems;  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/AO.99.099999 
1. Introduction 
Optical information security has sought to ensure the secure 
transmission of an image to a recipient. This area of research includes 
image encryption [1-15], authentication [16-24], and compression or 
secure storage [25, 26]. Authenticating sensitive information is critical 
to discovering tampering caused by a miscreant. Methodologies for 
image authentication includes both optical [16-21] and simulated [22, 
23] authentication schemes. 
Recently, authentication schemes have been investigated using 
optically tagged security codes [19-21]. In these authentication 
schemes, an object is optically tagged using a phase mask. In [19], these 
phase masks were as simple as Scotch tape. In [20], optical codes based 
on thin-film technology were produced for security applications. These 
structures generate distinctive polarimetric information that can be 
utilized to authenticate the message encoded. In [21], more complex 
phase masks consisted of embedding nanoparticle structures such as 
gold in an object. An optical set up was then used to authenticate 
objects containing the phase mask by illuminating the object with a 
laser diode. The polarimetric information from the object was 
recorded and used for authentication. In [16], an authentication 
scheme using a three-dimensional (3D) phase object was created by 
illuminating a 3D phase object with two different wavelengths and 
recording the resulting speckle pattern with a CCD device. These 
speckle patterns were then correlated with authentic speckle patterns 
from a database to verify the veracity of the 3D phase object.   
In this work, we propose a 3D optical phase code (OPC) by encoding 
a quick response (QR) code with a 3D optical phase mask.  An 
advantage of using a 3D optical phase mask compared with a 2D mask 
is its difficulty in being duplicated by simple examination of the optical 
phase mask or the resulting speckle pattern. The 3D optical phase 
mask may be generated in a variety of methods. In our experiments, it 
consists of a combination of glass slides and diffuser material. A 445 
nm wavelength blue laser diode is transmitted through the 3D OPC 
generating a unique speckle pattern that is recorded on a CCD.  From 
the recorded speckle pattern, the mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, 
and entropy is computed. The random forest classifier is then used to 
authenticate the phase masks.  
2. 3D Optical Phase Code Design and Feature 
Selection 
Three-dimensional OPCs were created as shown in Fig. 1. A 4 mm × 4 
mm QR code was first printed on transparency paper.  A 3D optical 
phase mask was then placed on the QR code. In the experiment, three 
phase mask configurations were used. As shown in Fig. 1(a), a glass 
slide and diffuser paper were placed on a QR code; we denote this 
configuration as 3D OPC A. Figure 1(b) depicts a glass slide and diffuser 
paper along with an additional glass slide and diffuser paper placed on 
a QR code; we denote this configuration as 3D OPC B. Lastly, Fig. 1(c) 
depicts a glass slide and diffuser paper along with an additional glass 
slide, diffuser paper, and glass slide placed on a QR code, generating 3D 
OPC C. We note that phase codes were held together by Scotch tape; 
however we verified that the tape was placed sufficiently far from the 
QR code. Thus, when illuminated by a laser source, the laser would not 
be transmitted through the tape. Fig. 2(a) shows the experimental 4 
mm × 4 mm QR code used while Fig. 2(b) depicts 3D OPC A. The 3D 
OPCs generate a highly nonlinear scattering of light due to being an 
inhomogeneous material [27-30]. In addition, the light transmitted 
through the 3D OPCs cannot be easily described with conventional 
wave propagation models [31]. This highly nonlinear light 
propagation, though difficult to model, can be used as a unique phase 
mask. Having this complex phase mask is ideal to serve as an optical 
tag to create a unique signature for an object. 
Once the 3D optical phase codes were developed, an optical 
experiment was carried out as shown in Fig. 3.  A 3D OPC was placed 
on a translation stage. A blue laser diode having a wavelength of 445 
nm was transmitted through first a polarizer to lower the intensity 
followed by a lens to expand the light. The light was then transmitted 
through the 3D OPC.  A Canon EOS 600D with a CCD sensor  size of 
14.9 mm (v) × 22.3 mm (w) was used to record the resulting speckle 
pattern which was 2784  (v) × 1856 (w) pixels. Twenty speckle 
patterns were recorded for when the 3D OPC was 30 mm, 70 mm, 110 
mm, and 150 mm from the CCD sensor. Note that the statistical 
properties of a speckle, which is a nonstationary process, can be 
influenced by environmental effects including vibrations [31]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Workflow for developing the 3D optical phase code for (a) 
3D optical phase code A, (b) 3D optical phase code B, and (c) 3D 
optical phase code C. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  (a) Experimental 4 mm × 4 mm QR code and a picture of 
(b) 3D optical phase code A, which consists of a QR code with an 
optical phase mask consisting of a glass slide and diffuser paper. 
A CCD is an intensity recording device and the recorded speckle 
patterns can be approximated as a statistical distribution. It can be 
shown that the statistical pattern can be approximated as a Gamma 
distribution [32]: 
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where I, I , and σ are the intensity data points, its average and the 
corresponding standard deviation, respectively. 
An example of the speckle patterns captured is shown in Fig. 4 for a 
distance, d, of 110 mm from the CCD using 3D OPCs A, B and C, 
respectively, along with their corresponding histograms. We note that 
the color map was adjusted to improve the visualization of the speckle. 
Using Eq. 1, a gamma distribution was also fitted to the histograms. 
The images were normalized to lie between the interval [0, 1].    
 
         
Fig. 3. Optical experimental setup. A 455 nm blue laser diode is 
transmitted through a polarizer and lens. The laser is then 
transmitted through the QR code which has a 3D optical phase 
mask placed on it. A CCD sensor, a distance d away from the QR 
code, records the speckle pattern. 
 
Fig. 4.  (a,b,c) The speckle patterns obtained using 3D optical 
phase codes A, B, and C, respectively. The 3D optical phase codes 
are a distance of 110 mm from the CCD sensor. The 
corresponding histograms and a fitted Gamma distribution are 
also shown. 
In our proposed authentication scheme, we extract statistical 
features from each speckle pattern to be used for classification. The 
chosen features were: mean, variance,  skewness, kurtosis, and 
entropy. The skewness and kurtosis can be used to examine the 
location and variability of a distribution, respectively [33]. The 
skewness measures the third moment of a distribution and measures 
the symmetry of a distribution. Since the speckle patterns are 
unimodal, negative skewness values mean the left tail is longer than 
the right tail of the distribution. Moreover, a positive skewness 
indicates the right tail is longer than the left tail. The kurtosis measures 
the fourth moment of a distribution and describes the curvature of the 
distribution. This metric measures how much the data is peaked or flat 
relative to a standard normal distribution. For feature extraction, the 
unbiased skewness and kurtosis was used [34]. Lastly, the entropy [35, 
36] measures the average uncertainty, or variability, of an image. The 
minimum uncertainty occurs at an entropy of 0. The mean, unbiased 
variance, skewness and kurtosis along with the entropy are defined as: 
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where μˆ is the sample mean, 2σˆ is the unbiased sample variance, sˆ is 
the unbiased skewness,  kˆ  is the unbiased kurtosis, H is the entropy, 
( )ip x denotes the probability mass function of xi found by using the 
relative frequency distribution [37], and N is the total number of pixels,.   
By calculating the mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, and entropy, 
pixel intensities no longer need to be stored; the only information 
needed are the five feature values and the classification model. An 
example of the features extracted at distances of 70 mm and 110 mm 
are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Example of mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, and 
entropy calculated for recorded speckle patterns 
3D Opitical 
Phase Code μˆ  
2σˆ  2sˆ  kˆ  H 
d =70 mm
A 0.099 0.037 0.7142 3.815 5.496
B 0.087 0.085 0.6202 3.629 4.958
C 0.106 0.073 0.7013 3.810 4.862
d=110 mm
A 0.070 0.030 0.9297 4.313 5.678
B 0.070 0.062 1.0310 4.982 4.682
C 0.065 0.059 1.1067 5.598 4.297
 
3. 3D Optical Phase Code Authentication Scheme 
We chose to use the random forest (RF) classifier [38, 39] for the 
classification model. This supervised, non-parametric classifier has 
reduced variance and is robust to overfitting. In essence, the random 
forest combines the outputs of many independent decision trees, 
which is a type of binary tree that contains nodes, branches, and leaves. 
A “vote” is made by averaging the final results of each decision and the 
majority vote indicates the predicted class of an input.  
The splits are based on the Gini’s diversity index (GDI) [38]. This 
metric measures the node impurity. The lower the GDI, the better the 
split. For a data set S at node M, the GDI is defined as: 
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where Κ is the number of predefined classes, pk(x) is the relative 
frequency [36] of class k  at node M defined as: 
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where ks  is the number of data points in class k, I is the indicator 
function, and N is the total number of data points in S at node M.  
The number of features selected, at random, is also calculated for 
each split.  The advantage of using a limited number of features is that 
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Table 3. Classification results for the 12 class system for when 
120 test images were used and 50 false class images 
   Predicted Class 
  True False
Actual 
Class 
True 120 0 
 False 0 50 
 
The accuracy of the classifier when the 3D OPC was shifted from 
their original positions was also evaluated. At distances of 70 mm, 110 
mm, and 150 mm, 3D optical phase code A was displaced up to +/- 10 
mm from the original position by increments of 1 mm. As the 3D 
optical phase code was further from the CCD device, the classifier was 
less sensitive to displacement errors as shown in Fig. 8. We note that 
the classifier was able to correctly classify speckles for all 
displacements about 110 mm and 150 mm; however, at 70 mm there 
were misclassifications at – 9 mm and – 10 mm.  Thus, a user must be 
mindful the distance the 3D optical phase code is from the CCD sensor. 
 
Fig. 7. A false class speckle pattern obtained by placing  3D optical 
phase code C 100 mm from the CCD  sensor. 
 
Fig. 8.  Effect of displacement of 3D optical phase code A on the 
class confidence score output from the random forest classifier 
for distances 70 mm, 110 mm, and 150 mm from the CCD sensor. 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we present an authentication scheme using a 
transparent QR code containing a 3D optical phase mask to generate a 
3D optical phase code (OPC). An advantage of a 3D optical phase mask 
over a 2D is that it is difficult to mathematically characterize a 3D code 
made of randomly scattering medium and/or to duplicate it physically. 
An optical authentication system was designed using 3 separate 3D 
OPCs which were placed 30 mm, 70 mm, 110 mm, and 150 mm from a 
CCD sensor. A 445 nm blue laser diode illuminated the 3D OPCs at each 
distance to generate a unique speckle pattern that was captured by the 
CCD. Feature extraction was then performed on the speckle pattern by 
calculating the mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, and entropy. A 
multiclass random forest classifier was used to classify the recorded 
speckles at each distance. A 100% accuracy rate was achieved. Thus, 
we have shown we can use mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis and 
entropy of a speckle image combined with the random forest classifier 
to determine the authenticity of a 3D OPC. Overall, it is difficult to 
reproduce the 3D optical code from either the resulting speckle pattern 
or visual inspection. As a result, we can use this 3D optical phase code 
system to authenticate an object.  
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